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 When one hurts or kills a women
one hurts or kills hummanity and is an antrocitie.
Gino d'Artali
and: My mother (1931-1997) always said to me <Mi figlio, non esistono notizie <vecchie> perche puoi imparare qualcosa da qualsiasi notizia.> Translated: <My son, there is no such thing as so called 'old' news because you can learn something from any news.>
Gianna d'Artali.

blood-stained hands and robes of the ‘Haqqani religious tribe’
Zan times - March 5, 2025 - By: Younus Negah
<<The blood-stained hands and robes of the ‘Haqqani religious tribe’
On the last day of February, Maulana Hamid ul-Haq Haqqani, the leader of the Sami-ul-Haq faction of Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam, one of Pakistan’s ultra-conservative political parties, and also the deputy head of Darul Uloom Haqqania, was assassinated in a suicide attack. According to media reports, his killer was dressed in clerical attire when he approached the politician after the conclusion of prayers at the Haqqania Mosque before detonating explosives hidden on his body. Given the events of the past few decades in Pakistan and Afghanistan, this news hardly comes as a surprise. Suicide bombings inside mosques are nothing new, nor is the assassination of extremist Pakistani politicians unexpected. Similarly, the killing of an individual associated with Darul Uloom Haqqania does not seem unusual. The Haqqani name has long been synonymous with suicide attacks. They operate suicide training centres, showcase their suicide battalions, and can fall victim to the very tactics they pioneered. Just a few months earlier, a suicide bomber assassinated Khalil-ur-Rahman Haqqani, the Taliban’s minister of refugees, within the ministry compound in Kabul on December 11, 2024. Maulana Hamid ul-Haq Haqqani, the slain leader of Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (S), was 56 years old. He had taken over the leadership of the party following the assassination of his father, Maulana Sami ul-Haq Haqqani in November 2018. Sami ul-Haq was the most prominent and controversial figure of the Akhunkhel clan — a lineage that, for generations, has been entangled in the bloody intersections of politics, religion, and commerce in the Indian subcontinent. The Akhunkhel, now widely known as the Haqqanis, trace their politico-religious lineage back to the 17th century and claim ancestral involvement in the Ghaznavid and Ghurid invasions of the Indian subcontinent. Known as the spiritual leader of the Taliban, Sami ul-Haq Haqqani was stabbed to death in Rawalpindi on November 2, 2018 at the age of 79. He had witnessed the beginning of U.S. negotiations with his Taliban protégés and was enjoying the political and financial successes that came with it. In 2018, his party’s office and madrasa in Akora Khattak became a hub for prominent political figures and foreign diplomats, including the U.S. ambassador to Islamabad and Ashraf Ghani, the then-president of Afghanistan. During these meetings, Sami ul-Haq openly campaigned for the Taliban’s return to power. At one point, in an interview with Reuters, he directly addressed the US government, declaring: “Just give them [the Taliban] one year, and they will make all of Afghanistan happy. The entire country supports them.” Sami ul-Haq did not live long enough to witness the “happiness” that the Taliban brought to Afghanistan. However, his son and political successor, Maulana Hamid ul-Haq, had reportedly grown increasingly dissatisfied with developments in Afghanistan and Pakistan during the past two years. Pakistani media outlets have speculated that the Taliban’s leader, Mullah Hibatullah Akhundzada, and his inner circle may have been involved in Hamid ul-Haq’s assassination in February. In an interview, prominent Pakistani journalist Najam Aziz Sethi claimed that the assassinations of Khalil-ur-Rahman Haqqani in Kabul as well as that of Hamid ul-Haq Haqqani in Akora Khattak were the result of internal Taliban power struggles and an attempt by Mullah Hibatullah to eliminate powerful rivals. According to Sethi, Hamid ul-Haq’s vocal support for girls’ education had angered the Taliban, and led to repeated death threats against him. Zulfiqar Hamid, the police chief of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, told Dawn newspaper that the madrasa Darul Uloom Haqqania had received multiple security warnings in the past year. As a precaution, the local government had deployed 17 security personnel to protect the madrasa as well as Maulana Hamid ul-Haq.
The Haqqani religious “tribe”
The Haqqani title first emerged in Afghan politics during the early years of the jihad against the Soviet invasion. For many years, it remained exclusive to the family of Jalaluddin Haqqani, the deputy of Yunus Khalis’s Hezb-e-Islami and one of the most powerful jihadist commanders, who operated primarily in southern and southeastern Afghanistan. He maintained an independent channel of communication with both the Pakistani military and intelligence services. Both Jalaluddin Haqqani and Yunus Khalis were educated at Darul Uloom Haqqania and had been teachers there at one time, according to Maulana Hamid ul-Haq Haqqani. They were allegedly instructed to abandon their teaching positions and join the Afghan jihad.
This information was revealed during a turban-tying ceremony at Darul Uloom Haqqania in early 2022. Hamid ul-Haq delivered his speech in the tone of a jihadist preacher. He urged the Taliban not to hide their association with Haqqania, stating: “To the Afghan Taliban, I say, you are our brothers, and we have stood behind your Emirate. I tell you, O Amir-ul-Mu’mineen, O Prime Minister of Kabul, Afghanistan, do not be ashamed of the name Haqqani … Say with pride that behind you stood the hands of Maulana Abdul Haq, Maulana Sami ul-Haq, and Maulana Noor ul-Haq, and it is because of them that the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan exists today.” This speech carried an aggressively triumphalist tone as it was delivered at the peak of a Pakistani ISI-backed campaign, led by General Faiz Hameed and the Imran Khan government, to boast about Pakistan’s role in bringing the Taliban to power. Just a year later, the political landscape shifted dramatically. Both Imran Khan and General Hameed fell out of favour with the Pakistani military and ISI. As a result, Hamid ul-Haq also changed his stance. A review of Hamid -ul-Haq’s speeches in the last four years of his life clearly reveals how his positions were dictated by the shifting priorities of Pakistan’s military generals. In a recently republished interview — likely recorded in late 2023 or early 2024 — Hamid ul-Haq distanced himself from his previous claim, denying that Darul Uloom Haqqania had played any direct role in the Afghan jihad. He asserted that Jalaluddin Haqqani and Yunus Khalis had joined the jihad of their own volition, without any directive from Haqqania’s founders and leaders. It is important to note that the administrators of Darul Uloom Haqqania openly acknowledge their political role and that of their madrasa. They participate in elections, campaign for parliamentary seats in Pakistan’s National Assembly and Senate, manoeuvre for influence in provincial and federal governments, and form alliances and rivalries with political parties. For them, religion and the madrasa are tools of power — and today, Haqqania stands as one of the most politically influential madrasas in the region. In the region where Darul Uloom Haqqania is located and in the political environment where the Haqqanis operate, tribal affiliations are just as prominent as religion. Despite being a madrasa with its own political party — one that adheres to republicanism, participates in elections, and maintains strong ties with Pakistan’s intelligence services and military — Haqqania also functions within a tribal structure. The madrasa’s primary mission is to assist the Pakistani state in managing the Pashtun question. Haqqania has accomplished this by weakening secular and nationalist Pashtun forces, offering an alternative identity to ethnicity, and creating a quasi-tribal network that links a broad coalition of Pashtun politicians, clerics, and influential figures across Afghanistan and Pakistan against Pashtun nationalism. Today, Haqqani has become a surname for thousands of Pashtuns active in politics, economics, culture, and education — competing for influence much like traditional Pashtun tribes such as the Ahmadzai, Barakzai, Popalzai, Mohmand, Yousafzai, Achakzai, and Khattak. The Haqqanis are now among the most powerful “Pashtun tribes” — without actually being a real tribe. Instead, they can be described as a religious tribe. In Afghanistan, the Haqqanis are in direct conflict with Afghan nationalists, while in Pakistan, they clash with Pashtun tribal elders, ethnic leaders, and nationalist activists. They speak Pashto, wear traditional Pashtun attire, and recruit from Pashtun communities, yet they view Pashtun interests through those of Pakistani generals and politicians who consider Pashtun nationalism a fundamental threat. The Haqqanis are now at war with the Pashtun Tahafuz Movement (PTM) in Pakistan and with republican and nationalist forces in Afghanistan. Over the two decades of Afghanistan’s republic, thousands of Pashtun intellectuals, tribal elders, and nationalists were assassinated on both sides of the Durand Line. The Haqqani religious tribe — which operates not only through the Haqqani Network but also in factions of the Afghan and Pakistani Taliban — is widely regarded as the primary perpetrator of these killings. The influence of Darul Uloom Haqqania and the Haqqani Network has become so deeply entrenched that even a Pakistani prime minister once uttered the Haqqani to be a Pashtun tribe. Similarly, in an interview, Pakistani journalist Saleem Safi asked Hamid ul-Haq Haqqani whether the Haqqani was truly a tribe. In response, the deputy head of Darul Uloom Haqqania clarified: “No, Haqqani is an honorary title for those who have studied at this madrasa.”
Akora Khattak: The nursery of the ‘Haqqani tribe’
In the political geography of the Pashtuns, Akora Khattak holds immense historical significance, comparable to Maiwand and Sher Surkh (Sher Surkh is considered the birthplace of the Abdali Empire, while Maiwand has become a symbol of resistance against colonialism). However, Akora Khattak earned its historical prestige long before Kandahar, Sher Surkh, and Maiwand. The town takes its name from Akor Khan, the grandfather of the renowned Pashto poet and warrior Khushal Khan Khattak. Akor Khan lived in the 16th century, during the Pashtun Sur Empire’s confrontations with the Mughal rulers of India. His grandson, Khushal Khan Khattak (1613–1689), became a legendary resistance poet and political leader, spearheading one of the most significant uprisings against the Mughal Empire. Throughout history, Akora and Nowshera have repeatedly served as battlefields for Pashtun rulers and warriors. Strategically located along the Kabul River, Akora and Nowshera have functioned as chokepoints for controlling the Peshawar Valley. From Mughal emperors and Sikh rulers of Punjab to British India and modern Pakistan, all have faced Pashtun resistance in Akora Khattak. Each time they captured it, they transformed it into a military and intelligence hub for governing the Pashtun territories. Today, the same pattern continues. Along the banks of the Kabul River in Nowshera, military barracks, training academies, intelligence agencies, and Darul Uloom Haqqania together form a powerful establishment that casts its influence across Pashtun society and Afghanistan as a whole. In this sense, Nowshera today plays a role in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and the broader Pashtun regions similar to what Rawalpindi plays in Pakistan’s military administration. The role of Haqqania in expanding and consolidating this power structure is far greater than that of military institutions in the region. As the apex of Pakistan’s soft and religious power, Darul Uloom Haqqania serves as a centre for ideological influence, directing and inspiring thousands of madrasas across Afghanistan and Pakistan. Each year, between 4,000 and 5,000 students (Talibs) receive full-time religious and ideological training at Haqqania. These students live, eat, and study within the madrasa’s walls. The majority come from Pashtun regions of Pakistan and Afghanistan, but a significant number of non-Pashtun Afghans, Central Asians, Iranians, Chinese, and even Arabs have also undergone training.
Haqqania’s graduates have spread across the region to become mullahs at mosques, schoolteachers, administrators, madrasa instructors, politicians, and jihadist fighters. As part of a religious faction and ideological movement, its followers maintain a strong allegiance to the madrasa and pride themselves on their Deobandi heritage. During the war against the Soviets in Afghanistan and the two decades of U.S. intervention, massive amounts of foreign funds flowed into the region. This vast financial support significantly strengthened political-religious factions like the Haqqanis. However, with the withdrawal of foreign aid and the end of the war — despite the Taliban’s victory — Pakistan and madrasas like Haqqania have found the “sweetness of triumph” turning bitter. In September 2023, two years after the Taliban’s return to power, Pakistani media reported that Darul Uloom Haqqania was facing a financial crisis. A video interview conducted with madrasa officials and students following the news highlighted their anxiety. One student stated: “In its 75-year history, Darul Uloom Haqqania has never experienced such difficult days.” Haqqania’s leaders downplay the impact of reduced foreign aid and the end of the “Afghan jihad” on their financial situation. They claim that their primary sources of funding come from donations, charity and religious tithes. However, given the sheer number of madrasas across Pakistan and Afghanistan, and the direct and indirect branches of Haqqania itself, these donations alone are insufficient to sustain the livelihoods of thousands of clerics and Talibs. The question remains: Will Haqqania successfully adapt to the changing geopolitical landscape or will it be forced to retreat from the ideological and political space it has long dominated? On February 28, Manzoor Pashteen, the leader of the Pashtun Tahafuz Movement (PTM) — the latest Pashtun nationalist movement opposing Pakistan’s jihadist projects — issued a brief statement condemning the suicide attack on Maulana Hamid ul-Haq Haqqani. He blamed Pakistani generals and intelligence agencies for the destruction of the Pashtun homeland and called on his fellow Pashtuns to unite against fundamentalism and violence. For Pashtun nationalists, Darul Uloom Haqqania and its Pashto-speaking leaders are seen as an extension of Pakistan’s intelligence apparatus. They do not regard the death of Hamid ul-Haq as a loss for the Pashtun community, nor do they mourn him in Pashto. The conflict between Pashtun nationalists and Pakistan’s religious-military projects continues. The Pakistani Taliban (TTP) has emerged as PTM’s primary rival, suppressing non-Taliban Pashtun political activism in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and further tightening the space for nationalist movements. For figures like Manzoor Pashteen, the TTP and the Haqqani religious tribe are nothing more than proxies of Pakistan’s military establishment who serve as enforcers of Islamabad’s interests in Pashtun lands. They believe that if the region does not once again become a battleground for foreign proxy conflicts and if the flow of dollars and weapons into jihadist networks is cut off, both the Taliban and the Haqqani religious tribe will weaken, while Pashtun nationalist forces will regain strength. The suppression of Pashtun nationalism in Pakistan has been a long-term historical project. Over time, it has eroded the traditional foundations of Pashtun political unity. Traditionally, Pashtun society was organized through tribal structures and ethnic coalitions. Leadership was in the hands of Khans, tribal elders, and influential tribal figures. Historically, Pashtuns were divided into two main social categories: Seyal (landowning members with a lineage to a dominant tribe) and Kispagar (landless artisans, professionals, traders who also include mullahs). The Akhunkhel, the founding ancestors of Darul Uloom Haqqania, were part of the Kispagar class. Over time, as powerful Pashtun Seyal families, including the descendants of Khushal Khan Khattak, weakened, the Akhunkhel rose to prominence. Unlike traditional Pashtun elites, the Akhunkhel do not claim lineage from any powerful Pashtun tribes. Instead, they have built their power through religion. Since Pashtun society remains largely tribal, the Akhunkhel — despite lacking a tribal Seyal heritage — have become the most dominant “tribe” by leveraging religious authority. Leadership in Pashtun tribal society has always required bloodshed. In the 17th century, Khushal Khan Khattak expressed this brutal reality in his poetry:
From my forefathers, I inherit the title of Khan and Sardar,
My legacy is one of battle and struggle.
Whether in victory or defeat, I have faced both,
And I carry within me the instinct for bloodshed and war.
My father and grandfather were martyred and buried,
For generations, our art has been to embrace martyrdom.
Over the past five decades, the Akhunkhel Haqqanis have displaced Khans and traditional aristocratic class. Now they kill and get killed. Maulana Sami ul-Haq Haqqani — the so-called “spiritual father of the Taliban” — was stabbed to death in his bed in Rawalpindi, the nerve centre of Pakistan’s jihadist elite. His son and successor, Hamid ul-Haq Haqqani, was assassinated in a mosque, using the same suicide attack method that Haqqanis themselves have long used to eliminate their rivals.
Younus Negah is a researcher and writer from Afghanistan who is currently in exile in Turkey.>>
Source: https://zantimes.com/2025/03/05/the-blood-stained-hands-and-robes-of-the-haqqani-religious-tribe/ 

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